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LEGAL OBSTACLES TO MINORITY PARTY SUCCESS
DURING the last ninety years, no national third party has succeeded in dis-
placing one of the two traditional parties or even in retaining more than an in-
significant fraction of popular support.1 With virtual unanimity, political sci-
entists have attributed a major portion of the responsibility for this chronicle
of failure to the exclusionary effect of the legal techniques2 by which the states
avowedly seek to present the voter with a short, comprehensible list of alterna-
tives on the general election ballot.3 It is the purpose of this comment to ex-
amine these statutory barriers in an effort to discover if they are unreasonably
inhibitory and have, in fact, kept small parties off the ballot, or whether the ex-
planation of the abortive careers of dissident groups lies somewhat deeper in
the American political structure.
1. The Prohibition, Socialist, and Socialist Labor parties have most consistently
appeared on the ballot in recent years. In the 1944 presidential election, their national
totals were: Prohibition, 74,758; Socialist, 80,518; Socialist Labor, 45,336. In this same
election, the Republican and Democratic parties received a total of 47,608,783 votes.
1948 WORLD ALAxAc 279.
Nevertheless, dissident political groups continue to attempt this path to govern-
mental control. See generally, HOLCOMBE, Tns POLITICAL PARTIES OF TODAY c.1l (1924) ;
ODEGARD AND HELMS, AMERIcAN POLITICS c.4 (1938); PENNIMAN, SAt'S AMERICAN
PARTIES AND ELECrIONS c.11 (4th ed. 1948). EwING, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (1940)
provides a breakdown of the minor party vote in presidential elections. A lighter treat-
ment is found in the lectures of HESsELTINE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THIRD PARTIES
(1948). See also Hicks, The Third Party Tradition in American Politics, 20 MIss. VAL-
LEY HIsT. REV. 3 (1933).
2. "As if this catalogue of obstacles were not sufficiently disheartening new legal
barriers have been brought forward ... it is to be regretted that the tendency of recent
years has been to raise such requirements to a figure which makes competition by third
parties impossible." BROOKS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL PRODLEMS 122, 265
(3d ed. 1933). Demands for the tightening of laws relating to nominations tend "virtually
to exclude political protestants from participation in primaries and conventions, while at
the same time making it increasingly difflcult for them to launch new party movements."
ODEGARD AND HELMS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 782. There is a "tendency which grows
stronger year by year in state after state to monopolize the ballot for the Democratic
and Republican parties by making the entry of new or minority party slates on the ballot
almost impossibly difficult." Thomas, Reflections of an Old Campaigner, 41 CO M0o-
WEAL 246 (1944). In Cort, Third Party?, 44 COIMONWEAL 351 (1946), Harold Ickes
is quoted to the effect that the election laws of many states make it "almost impossible"
to put a third party on the ballot, and Dr. Frank Kingdon is said to have stated: "Don't
go dreaming about a third party that can't be organized now. In 20 states we couldn't
organize at all." (Emphasis added throughout.) Cf. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
MINORITY PARTIES ON THE BALLOT 6 (1943).
3. See Starr, The Legal Status of American Political Parties, 34 AMs. POL. Scd. REV.
439, 455 (1940); PENNIMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 263: "Perhaps it is not a mere
persecution complex that suggests a conspiracy of Democrats and Republicans. [See note
2 supra]. Yet, in the main, the sense of grievance has no solid foundation. . . Enthusi-
asts fail to see that, from the public standpoint, it may be desirable to keep the ballot
from being encumbered and that very few voters think otherwise." Cf., concerning the
primary ballot, id. at 411-2. But see AMERICAN CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION, op. Cit. supra
note 2, at 6-7; Note, Limitations on Access to the General Election Ballot, 37 COL. L. REv.
86 (1937) ; The National Prohibitionist, Mar. 1, 1946, p. 1, cols. 1-4.
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THE PRIMARY ELECTION
Established "political parties"-defined usually by a minimum percentage or
number of the total votes cast in the last general election (ranging from Yz of
1% to 25%, and from 500 to 50,000) 4-are ordinarily required to nominate
their tickets for the general election in party primaries. Groups receiving a
minimal portion of the vote in a previous election, though not enough to
qualify as regular "political parties," may nevertheless nominate by primary in
one state,5 and three states allow any political group to participate in the pri-
mary by filing a petition.0 If in Florida 57, or in California 1%, of the regis-
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While the above tabulation does not include Kansas, Nebraska, and South Dak:ota,
the figures total 48 because California, North Carolina, and Olahoma have alternative
definitions. Kansas deems any group having a state or national organization a party. Any
convention of 750 voters is recognized as a party in Nebraska. In South Dakota, any
group submitting a petition signed by 10% of the last vote for Governor, prior to the
primary, is a party.
In California, Illinois, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio and Utah, a
group may qualify as a regular party by submitting a petition previous to the primary.
For the number or percentage of signatures required, and for data on individual states and
statutory citations, see Charts pp. 1292-7 infra.
5. Kentucky and Oregon. For all statutory citations hereafter, see Charts pp.
1292-7 infra.
6. Arizona, Oklahoma, and Wrisconsin. And see note 4 supra.
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tered voters declare their affiliation with the new group well in advance, they
may participate in the primary.7
THE GENERAL ELECTION
Holding their regulations to a minimum, eleven states condition the appear-
ance of any political group's nominees on the general election ballot only on
their being certified by a convention.8 Three others extend this privilege to
groups which have participated in previous elections and have received varying
degrees of support.9
Finally, in forty states a political faction may enter the general election by
means of an independent nominating petition.' 0 In a number of instances, one
of the simpler techniques indicated previously is available, either in the alterna-
tive or exclusively; but far more frequently the direct petition is the only
means of nomination that a protestant group may employ. Accordingly, the
restrictions circumscribing utilization of this device are the target for most
criticism of state ballot laws. Four principal problems ard involved: (1) num-
ber of signatures required; (2) apportiohment of signatures; (3) authentica-
tion of signatures; and (4) time for filing.
Signatures Required"
The number of signatures required ranges from Y/ of 1% of the vote for
any successful candidate in the last general election to 5% of the registered
7. See discussion p. 1282 and note 28 infra.
8. Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington. In South Carolina, any group may print and dis-
tribute its own ballots. New York, North Carolina, and Texas allow convention nomlna-
tion of presidential electors. For the particular conditions surrounding each convention,
see Charts pp. 1292-7 infra.
9. Indiana (Y2 of 1% of last vote for Secretary of State) ; Massachusetts (1/10 of
1% in the last 3 biennial elections) ; and Vermont (1%o of last vote for Governor).
10. In Delaware, Idaho, Michigan, New Mexico and Washington, a new party
nominates by convention. In South Carolina, any group may print and distribute its own
ballots. It has been noted that this method destroys ballot secrecy. AMERICAN CIVIL
LmERTIES UNION, op. cit. supra note 2, at 47. In North Carolina, a group qualifies as a
party by submitting a petition of 10,000 signatures, and may then nominate its candidates
tor presidential electors by convention. Since other candidates must be nominated by
primary, they cannot be named until the year following that in which the party qualifies.
See p. 1282 infra. In Florida, no provision is made for a new party by petition or convet-
tion. See p. 1282 infra. In Michigan, groups not receiving 2% of the last total vote for
Secretary of State are permitted to nominate for certain offices by a petition bearing
signatures equal in number to 1% of the last vote for Secretary of State. MIcu. STATS.
ANNO. c.57, § 6.121 (1936). But this provision appears repealed by implication. Id., c.57,
§ 6.349 (Supp. 1947) (requires groups not qualifying as "political parties" to nominate by
caucus or convention, and apparently covers the offices specified in § 6.121). See Rr,.
ATir'y GEN. MIcE. 548 (1930-2) ; Jackson v. Corrections Commission, 313 Mich. 352, 21
N.W. 2d 159 (1946).
11. In all states, petition signers must be registered voters. In a number of states, a
person is disqualified from signing an independent nominating petition if he has voted in
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voters, and, in the states using absolute numbers, from 15 to 25,000.12 There
a party primary. In New York, for instance, a petition signer may register after signing
an independent petition, Kerns v. Whiting, 187 Misc. 656, 65 N.Y.S. 2d 237 (Sup. Ct.,
1946), but a person may not sign a petition if (1) he signed a primary designating peti-
tion; or (2) he voted in the primary. Sullivan v. Cohen, 180 Misc. 750, 44 N.Y.S.
2d 280 (Sup. Ct., 1943). On the other hand, a Kentucky court has held that it is im-
material that petition signers are registered as Republicans or Democrats and have voted
in the party primary. Greene v. Slusher, 300 Ky. 715, 190 S.AV. 2d 29 (1945). In Rhode
Island, those who have voted in a political party primary may not sign an independent petition
for 26 months afterwards. R. I. GEz. LAws c. 316, § 10 (1933).
12. TABLE II
METHODS OF DETERa Nm G PEm=oX SlGNATuRES REQUnD By STA=r.
(with approximate number required in states setting percentages higher than 1M)
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appears to be no objective criteria to determine a reasonable signature require-
ment. The American Civil Liberties Union, in its model election law, has sug-
gested a maximum of 1/10 of 1% of the last total vote for governor.10 While
so low a requirement may be desirable, a standard of 1% of the vote in the last
general election would hardly deny the ballot to groups representing significant
elements of the electorate.
Under the 1% criterion, only eight states may be regarded as imposing un-
duly severe requirements.1 4
Apportionment
Four states,' 5 apparently to discourage the rise of sectional parties, stipulate
that each county be represented by a given number of signatures on the nomi-
nating petition, or in the alternative or as well, permit no county to furnish
more than a set percentage of the signatures. Nowhere is the requirement prej-
udicial to a state-wide third party ;10 in each case, the maximum representa-
tion permitted a county on the nominating petition is well above the proportion
of voters in state-wide elections resident in the county. Thus, in Massachusetts,
for example, where no more than Y of the signatures may be obtained in any
13. AmERiCAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, op. cit. supra note 2, at 12, 15.
14. California, Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and
South Dakota. All the states setting the requirements in round numbers (see note 12
supra) fall within the 1% classification. By the criterion suggested by the American Civil
Liberties Union, only 17 states have reasonable provisions.
15. Illinois, Massachusetts, New York and Ohio.
16. Note must be taken, however, of the iniquities claimed by the Progressive Party
to result from the apportionment requirement in Illinois: "When you consider that close
to half of the entire population of the state is contained within one county (Cook), you
can visualize the difficulty of securing the requisite number of signatures from the other
49. Most of these counties have an average population of 10,000, only half of whom are
registered voters in the first place. Of the 5,000 registered voters, roughly half voted in
the primary [and are accordingly ineligible to sign] leaving a reservoir of 2,500 people
from whom a minimum of 200 signatures must be gathered, and in order to be completely
safe, approximately 300 signatures should be gathered." Communication to the Yale Law
Journal from William H. Miller, State Director, Progressive Party, May 27, 1948. The
requirement is perhaps prejudicial to any party seeking to speak solely for the residents
of a small area within a state or for the urban or rural population exclusively. Cf. Asmu-
CAN CivL LIBERTIES UNION, op. cit. supra note 2, at 4.
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one county, the 1944 presidential election figures show that the largest single
county vote was 23 % of the total. 7
Authentication
To minimize fraud,' all states permitting the nominating petition require
that signatures be authenticated. In most cases, this provision is satisfied by an
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Source: 1948 VoRL ALmANAC 256, 261, 262, 267, 269.
18. "Fraud occurs most frequently where agents are employed and paid a few cents for
each signature. As a rule, the public officers who check petitions perform this duty in a
perfunctory way. At times, however, a careful exmmination has revealed the most out-
rageous impostures, the presence of fictitious names, and of names copied in the same
handwritings from the register of voters or from the telephone directory." PmznsrAn,
op. cit. mcpra note 2, at 411. See also J. P. HARRMS, REGISTRATION OF VOTER~S In. THE
Un=a STATES (1929), and ELEcTION ADmisTRATION IN THE UNInEa STATES (1934).
The Pittsburgh Press published the names of 4,800 Communist party petition signers
in 1940. 1,800 claimed they did not know what they had signed. Thirty convictions fol-
lowed for perjury, conspiracy, and obtaining signatures under false pretenses. A similar
tactic has been employed in 1948 with respect to petitions for Henry Wallace. Again some
signers have reneged: "they thought it vms a petition for Palestine partition, or against
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however, insist that each signature be notarized.'0 In five of these, the effect is
to require individual authentication of from 300 to 3,900 signatures. And in
Missouri, where approximately 31,000 signatures are necessary,2 0 each must be
certified by a notary who personally knows the signer, or by two "credible"
witnesses who can swear to his identity.
This latter kind of law deserves the most severe castigation; by no standard
can it be adjudged a "reasonable" regulation of elections. Even where the num-
ber of signatures is as small as 300, there appears no reason to impose such a
requirement. An affidavit by each circulator covering the signatures he has ob-
tained would seem to combine, in fairest balance, security for the state from
fraud with absence of exclusionary restrictions on new groups.
Filing Dates
Independent nominating petitions must be filed in May or earlier of the elec-
tion year in five states.21 Although nominations must certainly be closed at a
reasonable time before elections to permit printing of ballots and concentration
of voter attention on a limited number of alternatives, these desiderata might
be adequately served by filing deadlines in July or August. Third parties
would then nowhere be forced to develop and manifest their strength long be-
fore the voters' apathy has been dispelled by the imminence of elections.
Miscellaneous Difficulties
Four states must be separately mentioned. Florida makes no real provision
for a new political party. Any group which at any time during the four years
preceding the election year had 5% of the voters registered under its name,
and nominates candidates for the primary, is a party, But no procedure for
nomination by petition is provided. 22 The North Carolina State Board of Elec-
tions has interpreted the law to exclude new parties from nominating candi-
dates except for President and Vice-President until the primary election fol-
lowing the year in which the party qualifies.23 Unless a party in Ohio partici-
pates in the primary,2 it is apparently barred from nominating a slate of presi-
the city anti-smoke law, or against war; two confessed that 'I was drunk at the time'."
Time Magazine, April 26, 1948, p. 66.
19. Colorado, Minnesota, Missouri, Texas, Utah and Vermont.
20. The technical requirement is 29 of the last general election vote. A total of
1,571,678 votes was cast in Missouri in 1944. 1948 WoRLD AL-ANAC 264.
21. Alabama, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and West Virginia.
22. See Britten, Florida Prohibitionists Fight for Place on Ballot, The National
Prohibitionist, March 1, 1945, p. 6, cols. 1, 2, 3.
23. This ruling was made March 20, 1948. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 163-1 (1943).
Communication from Attorney General of North Carolina to the Yale Law Journal, May
5, 1948.
24. Such participation would require submission of a petition signed by 1%5 of the
voters at the last general election 90 days before the primary, or about February 4, a
date even earlier than the filing time considered unreasonable, p. 1282 supra.
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dential electors in the same year that it is formed.2 In Louisiana, a petition
must be signed by 1,500 voters not affiliated with any "political party." The
task is a political impossibility ;26 the Democratic primary is invariably deter-
minative of the election, and, in order to vote in the primary, a person must be
enrolled with the party as well as registered to vote. Moreover, to change party
affiliation, the voter must apply in writing to the local registrar.
REASONABLE OR REsnucrn'n?
Of the eight states which do not employ the independent nominating petition,
only Florida and North Carolina place unwarranted obstacles in the path of a
new party's appearance on the ballot.- Among the forty states permitting the
petition, eighteen, with 235 electoral votes, unreasonably circumscribe its use--
by the standards here established-and afford no ready alternative.
Louisiana and Ohio are so classified in view of the special circumstances just
set out above. Missouri must be categorized as difficult on two grounds: it sets
an unreasonably high requirement for the number of petition signers, and in
addition, obliges individual notarization of signatures. California,=s Georgia'
Massachusetts, 0 Nevada, and South Dakota all demand an unnecessarily
large number of signatures on petitions.3 0 The requirement of individual
notarization of signatures obliges stigmatization of Colorado, Minnesota,
Utah,31 Texas,32 and Vermont. Finally, Alabama, Maryland, New Jersey,
25. This is the seemingly correct interpretation of the new Ohio statute: "On the
presidential ballot shall be printed the names of the candidates for election to the offices
of president and vice president of the United States, nominated as such by the national
conventions of those parties at the next preceding primary election." Onro Ga.. CoD,
§ 4785-107 (Page, Supp. 1947). This interpretation was unsuccessfully challenged by the
Prohibition Party in State cx rcl. Mecartney v. Hummel, No. 31,410 (Sup. Ct. June 16,
1948) 150 Ohio St.-(1948); The National Prohibitionist, Jan. 1, 1948, p. 1, cots. 1-4. The
Wallace party has also attacked the provision. See PM, June 11, 1948, p. 6, cols. 5, 6.
26. AEmucAN CvIr LmERTms UN ro, op. cit. supra note 2, at 24.
27. Delaware, Idaho, Michigan, New Mexico, and Washington all have simple con-
vention requirements. South Carolina allows each party to print and distribute its on
ballots.
28. In California, a group equal in number to 1% of the vote for any statewide can-
didate in the last general election may become a party by declaring itself to the local
registrar. But, since this action must be taken at least 75 days before the primary, it
does not seem a sufficiently feasible alternative for a new party to permit removal of
California from the difficult class.
29. A group which received 1/10 of 1% of the total vote in the last 3 biennial elec-
tions in Massachusetts may nominate by convention. While this permits an established
minority group to present its candidates with ease, the way is still barred to new dissident
factions.
30. Montana and Oregon, as noted previously, require an inordinate number of signa-
tures on nominating petitions, but a third party may nominate by convention.
31. Under Utah law, a group may become a party by filing a petition with 500
signatures, not individually notarized, previous to the primary. But, because this alterna-
tive requires intense party activity at so early a date, it will be of little value to a newly-
formed group. Therefore it still appears necessary to consider the state as difficult.
32. A new group in Texas may, however, nominate presidential electors only by
convention.
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Pennsylvania, and West Virginia 3 fall into the difficult classification because
they set extremely early filing dates.
EFFECT OF THE STATUTES
There are, then, a number of unreasonable restrictions on the claims of dis-
sident groups to appearance on the ballot.34 These impediments are, moreover,
reinforced by a variety of social pressures, ranging from a discriminatory tone
in judicial and administrative enforcement to the permitted use of violence
against minor-party workers. 5 Yet, these facts notwithstanding, a number of
third parties have regularly appeared on the ballot in most states.
Thirty-three states have had places on their ballots for one or more minority
party candidates in each of the last four presidential elections.30 Of the twenty
states classified here as presenting unreasonable legal barriers, eleven have
33. The convention method alternately available in West Virginia affords no benefit
on this count, for the convention must have been held by the time the petitions are due.
34. In addition to the limitations forming the subject matter of this discussion, nine
states, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Kansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Wisconsin
and Wyoming prohibit the appearance on the ballot of groups which: (1) advocate the
oveithrow by force of the government of the state or of the United States; (2) carry on
a program of sabotage, force, violence or treason; or (3) are affiliated with a named
organization or with any foreign government or organization or with any group which
advocates the overthrow by force of the government of the state or of the United States.
Five of these states also require a new party to file an affidavit discussing subversive aims.
Texas specifically bars candidates of the Communist, Nazi and Fascist parties from
running for office. All state laws. predicating ballot appearance on political orthodoxy
may, at least in part, be constitutionally offensive. See Communist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal.
2d 536, 127 P.2d 889 (1942); Feinglass v. Reinecke, 48 F.Supp. 438 (D.C. Ill. 1943);
Groner, State Control of Subversive Activities in the United States, 9 FED. BAR J. 61 (1947) ;
Comment, Special Legislation Discriminating Against Specified Individuals and Groups,
51 YALE L. J. 1358 (1942) ; Note, Statutes Banning the Communist Party, 54 HARv. L. RaV.
155 (1940). But cf. Field v. Hall, 201 Ark. 77, 143 S.W.2d 567 (1940).
On the doctrine of guilt by association, an integral part of all the above statutes, see
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1944) ; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 1
(1943) ; O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 41 HARV. L. REv. 592 (1948) ;
Note, Constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley Non-Communist Affidavit Provision, 48 CoL.
L. REv. 253 (1948) ; Comment, In re Harry Bridges, 52 YALE L. J. 108 (1942).
A Pennsylvania statute, much narrower than those of the above states, is in all
probability so worded as to escape constitutional attack.
These attempts to limit the outer fringes of protest opinion by statutory inter-
diction do not appear epidemic. The ten state laws currently in force were passed in 1941
or before. Many other states have since considered such legislation and refused to pass it,
and a few states have repealed statutes enacted earlier. Ward, The Communist Party and
the Ballot, 1 BILL OF RIGHTs Rr-v. 286 (1941).
35. AmERIcAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8. Cf. Graham v.
Moore, 56 Ariz. 106, 105 P. 2d 962 (1940). See also the technique of publishing the
names of petition signers, note 20 supra. Such publication is required by Maryland law.
MD. CODE ANNo. Art. 33, § 44 (Flack, Supp. 1947). For a minority party's version of
such difficulties, see PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONVENTION OF SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY
221-8 (1940).
36. All except Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
1281 (Vol. 57: 1276
1948] LEGAL OBSTACLES TO MINORITY PARTY SUCCESS 1285
regularly permitted one or more third party candidates to seek office 3 Today,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vcrmont,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. 1948 WoRLD ALmANAC 251 ff.
In 1944, the Socialist and Prohibition Parties each presented candidates in 27 states.
William Lemke's new Union Party had a slate in 35 states in 1936. Ibid.
TABLE IV
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the Wallace party is confident that its ticket will be presented in more than
forty states, and thus far has been excluded in only two.38
DEDuCTIONS FROM TH, DATA
The foregoing statistical analysis suggests that some material revision of
the current attitude that state ballot legislation throttles third parties is in order.
The primary conclusion that may be drawn from the analysis is that a protes-
tant group must have a minimal amount of popular support to place its ticket
on the general election ballot. But to gain this support is hardly an additional
obstacle for a third party. Its decision to act independently is usually prompted
by a desire to replace one of the major party organizations.3 If it is to ac-
complish this aim, support on a scale far larger than present ballot require-
ments is necessary.
The task of a third party seeking major-party status is formidable in a so-
ciety which generally employs the plurality election system. 40 To attract the
necessary support under these conditions, it must compete with two major
parties with professional, nation-wide organizations. The record amassed by
the established parties in consistently capturing the machinery of government 4
confers a material advantage in the eyes of the voter interested in putting a
program into effect, as it also provides an opportunity to reap the rewards of
patronage disbursement.42 Less rational, but nonetheless of enormous signifi-
38. Florida and Oklahoma. See discussion of Florida p. 1282 supra. N. Y. Times, June
6, 1948, p. 38, col. 1. In Oklahoma, the petitions submitted by Wallace backers were chal-
lenged under that state's ballot loyalty law. Cooper v. Cartwright, No. 33,588 (Sup.
Ct) ; Davis v. Foote, No. 117,775 (D. C. Okla. County). On June 12, the State Supreme
Court ruled that the Wallace Progressives did not constitute a political party under Okla-
homa laws. N. Y. Times, June 13, 1948, p. 23, col. 7. On the doubtful status of minority
parties under the new Ohio law, see note 25 s=pra.
39. Norman Thomas, perennial socialist presidential candidate, has aptly voiced this
ever-springing, if perhaps wistful, hope: "Socialists and others who have tried to build
'third parties' have always acted in the hope of becoming a first or second party, as did
the Republicans between 1856 and 1860." Reflections of an Old Canpaigncr, 41 CommoN-
WEAL 246, 247 (1944).
40. For an excellent discussion of the effects of the electoral system on minor parties,
see SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 74-80 (1942). It should also be noted that
there are other aspects of our governmental system that make successful third party action
more difficult. One author lists among "political" difficulties: the decentralized nature of
our government with its division of powers between national and state governments; the
directly elected executive, an office fully as important to capture as the legislature; and
the power of the Supreme Court to set aside legislation. DOUGLAS, TnE CoMING OF A
NEw PARTy 129-38 (1932). He includes as well under this category the legal require-
ments of ballot legislation. For further discussion, see Baooxs, op. cit. mrpra note 2,
at c.7; HOLCOMBE, THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF TODAY, C.11 (1924); ODEGARD AND HELMs,
op. cit. supra note 1, at c.2 3.
41. "There are only two candidates representing the two major parties with a chance
of winning. The voters want to try to help pick the winner." Thomas, supra note 39, at
246.
42. Patronage is the means both of gaining actual support and of maintaining and
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cance in explaining the "traditional" support given the two parties, are the in-
fluence of family43 and the symbol value of party principles in given commu-
nities.44
To overcome these handicaps, a third party must break new ground. There
is no fund of traditional straight party-line strength to draw upon. Instead,
every vote is a conscious vote for the new party. To make the voter willing to
cast it obviously involves the elaboration of a program designed to attract votes.
But by far the most important task is that of organization. This task is not
merely one of recruiting personnel to advocate the program; required is the
development of a feeling in the individual voter of participation in the party's
affairs, and a will to seek the solution to his problems through the new organi-
zation.
Demonstrative of the validity of this analysis are the presidential campaigns
of Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 and Robert La Follette in 1924. They were
the most successful third party efforts since the Civil War, Roosevelt actually
polling a larger popular and electoral vote than Taft. Yet, for different rea-
sons, both movements disintegrated before the next presidential elections.
The La Follette candidacy was an attempt to make an appeal solely to pro-
building up a party organization that can continue to appeal effectively to the electorate.
A good ea-mmple of its possibilities mas provided in the New Deal era. "The new services
performed by the national government brought about a vast extension of the civil service,
largely outside the merit system. By June 30, 1937, 220,000 new jobs had been created;
and patronage has always been the chief resource of politicians in building a machine."
PEN iAN, op. cit. mtpra note 1, at 235.
43. Merriam and Gosnell observed some time ago that the voter's preference for the
Republican or Democratic party is not based on principles and program. They have es-
timated that about 75% of the voters have a "hereditary" allegiance to one or other of
the two parties. THE AmERICAN P.uTy SYsTEm 28 (2d ed. 1929).
44. "To the south of the Mason-Dixon line, ... the Democratic party has been
thought of in a sentimental revery of wisteria and moonlight as the body which enabled
the South before the Civil War to dominate Capitol Hill and during the Reconstruction
period to overthrow negro and carpetbag government and thus make Southern Caucasian
civilization safe at last.. . . Nor are the native Anglo-Saxons alone in sharing these
passionate attachments. The negroes in the northern and border states fed indebted to
the party which gave them freedom and cast their votes with almost complete regu-
larity for it. ... The Germans of the Mississippi Valley threw their lot in with the Re-
publicans at the time of the Civil War and the memory of Sigel's Division still exercises
its sway over large groups of sturdy burghers. In the Northwest, the Scandinavians who
poured in after the Civil War to settle Minnesota and the Dakotas came to feel that it
vwas Jim Hill and the Republican Party which gave them their homesteads and whose
everlasting arms buoyed them up. .. !' DoUGLAs, op. cit. supra note 40, at 122. The fact
that these traditional attachments are, of course, subject to change is borne out by the
shift of the Negro vote to the Democratic party during the New Deal era. O-.amr~ AND'a
HELMS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 793, note that the very vagueness of principles is an asset
to the two parties: "Thus in one state they may be radically pro-labor and pro-agrarian,
or both, while in another they may be equally pro-business, in one section wet and in
another dry, thus cutting the ground from under any new party appealing spedfically to
any one of these interests."
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gram and personality. Pending the results of the election, organization on the
local level was deliberately postponed.45 La Follette's vote of about 4,700,000,
representing some 16% of the entire popular vote and an electoral vote of
13,4" hardly met expectations. The movement soon collapsed as a result of the
loss of its leader and the absence of an organization to sustain it.47 On the
other hand, the Bull Moosers of 1912 had not only a popular leader and an at-
tractive program, but also an impressive organization. 48 Their popular vote of
27% and electoral vote of 88 might be said to approximate the maximum that
could be expected in a first trial of strength with two functioning major parties.
The great question centered around the ability to maintain this new organiza-
tion and to secure an even greater popular support for the next presidential
election. But the preliminary answer given in the Congressional elections of
19144) clearly pointed out the movement's shortcomings. Its support in 1912
45. Announcing his candidacy in 1924, Senator La Follette declared: "Permanent
political parties have been born in this country after, and not before national political
campaigns, and they have come from the people, not from the proclamations of individual
leaders. . . . If the hour is at hand for the birth of a new political party, the American
people next November Will register their will and their united purpose by a vote of such
magnitude that a new political party will be inevitable." Quoted in DOAN, TuIE LA
FOLLETTES AND THE WISCONSIN IDEA 125 (1947).
46. La Follette was able to carry only his home state, Wisconsin.
47. La Follette died seven months after the election. With respect to the organiza-
tional problem, Hesseltine observes that: "The lesson that a party needed local candidates,
wardheelers, and door-bell ringers was made more obvious by the Congressional returns.
The 69th Congress, elected in 1924, had a majority of stalwart Coolidge Republicans, and
the Party's insurgents no longer held a balance of power." HESSELTiNE, op. cit. jupra
note 1, at 33.
La Follette was successful in the one state where he had built up an effective personal
machine capable of assuring him continued support whether working through the Re.
publican primaries or an independent political movement.
48. The Progressive Party in 1912 was, of course, organized by the insurgent wing
of the Republican party. Intra-party fighting with the conservatives and regulars had
prepared the group for the practical tasks of political organization. Moreover, they held
important positions in state and national government. See THE AUTOUIOGRAPIIY OF WIL-
LTAm ALLEN WHITE 60-4 (1946). In no fewer than 16 states Roosevelt men were on
the electoral tickets of the Republican party. In a last-minute effort two or three weeks
before the election, Republicans finally "purged" these tickets in every state except Cali-
fornia. There the Progressives did not lose control of the machine, and did not permit
any ticket to be voted by loyal Republican supporters. 2 STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE
PRESIDENCY 300-1 (2d ed. 1916).
So strong was the Progressive organization that even as late as 1915 the party's
chances of survival appeared favorable: "That this is likely is shown not only by the
fact that the new party controls several of the largest states, but also by the fact that in
states where it is comparatively weak, as in New York, thorough party organization has
been effected. Lecture bureaus, educational bureaus, and legislative drafting bureaus have
been formed for the purpose of aiding in the solution of vital social and economic prob-
lems of modern life so far as they are affected by government." DEWITT, Tnv PRO-
GREssIVE MOVEMENT 88 (1915).
49. "The Progressives lost 8 members of the House, falling from 15 to 7 while their
popular votein the country did not reach one-half . . . what it was in 1912. The decisive de-
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had been a protest vote. Allegiance had not been transferred from the two
major parties. As a result, the Progressive movement became "a group of
leaders without followers.!" Roosevelt's refusal to run as presidential candi-
date in 1916 was the signal for a collapse even among the leadership and it was
a reunited Republican party that fought the 1916 campaign.
This experience puts the problem of the legal requirements of ballot legisla-
tion in a more realistic light. To compete successfully with the major parties a
third party must organize and develop through time; it can not stake all on one
spectacular bid but must anticipate the exigencies of permanence. If this at-
titude is taken, ballot legislation imposes no new demands. The collection of a
given number of signatures within a specified time tests the strength of the new
organization and can well become a possible means of gaining the necessary
contact with the individual voterY'l The requirement that such signatures be
divided over a given number of counties is but a call to develop the extensive
local organization without which a party cannot hope to win an election. The
suspicion becomes all too strong therefore that complaints about legal require-
ments are either attempted shields for inadequacy or evidence of unwillingness
to think realistically.
Indeed, a consideration of the record of third party endeavor might suggest
that the greatest hopes for success lie in pursuing tactics other than an at-
tempted replacement of one of the two major parties. Direct primary legisla-
tion in all but one state52 offers the tactical possibility of "boring from within."
Instead of facing the organizational difficulties involved in capturing political
power through independent action, a protestant group has the far simpler al-
ternative of capturing a major party organization by persuading the party
members to nominate dissident candidates as their standard-bearers.
The successful use of this tactic has not brought about the loss of organiza-
tional strength. In the interests of winning the general election for the party,
the personnel of the organization has generally supported the successful candi-
date.ra Nor are the other advantages of minor magnitude. First, the protes-
cline of the Progressive vote was one of the most significant features of the election
which indicated that the Republican party would be looked to as the leading party of the
opposition and that the country preferred to maintain the traditional two-party system."
See Woodburn, Politics and Parties, Am. Y. B. 47, 53 (1914).
50. See THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAm ALLENt WHrrE 517 (1946).
51. The petition method is obviously of value for purely publicity purposes, for the
regular appearance of petition distributors helps make the party a familiar institution,
while the collection of more signatures than the total required may well impress voters
with the support gained. A good e.xample is provided by the Wallace movement in
California, where legal status was recently attained with the collection of 461,280 signa-
tures, three and one-half times more than necessary.
Still another reason for the collection of superfluous signatures is the fear of invali-
dation of petitions.
52. Connecticut still has the convention system. For details of the various systems
possible, see PENNIMAN, op. cit. spra note 1, at 303-4.
53. See remarks of Senator Borah: "Any man who can carry a Republican primary
is a Republican. He might believe in free trade, in unconditional membership in the
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tant group is given a preliminary opportunity to compete for support among a
smaller number of the electorate, for only the voters of the party within which
the struggle takes place are involved. Secondly, the voter is not asked to break
his traditional ties with either major party. Finally, the successful candidate
benefits in the general election not only from the support of his own faction but
also from the votes of those who traditionally vote the straight party ticket.
These observations do not present a mere theoretical possibility. The most
famous instance of an independent group capturing a major party organization
was the success of the Non-Partisan League of North Dakota. Selecting can-
didates in its own conventions, the League placed them in the primaries of the
Republican party." In 1916, it won the primary, gained control of the party
organization, and won the general election. In 1920 and 1922, its candidates
won the state's seats in the United States Senate.55 Spreading its influence to
some dozen states,56 the League usually employed the same tactics. Only in
Minnesota and South Dakota, where the League failed to capture a major
League of Nations, in states' rights, and in every policy that the Democratic party ever
advocated, yet if he carried his Republican primary, he would be a Republican. He might
go to the other extreme and believe in the communistic state, in the dictatorship of the
proletariat, in the abolition of private property, and in the extermination of the bourgeoisie,
yet if he carried his Republican primary, he would still be a Republican." Berdahl, Party
Membership in the United States, I, 36 Am. POL. Sc. Rrv. 16-7 (1942). James Farley
observed: ". . . the vendetta must end when the nominations have been made. Party
loyalty is requisite for party success. Discipline is as necessary in the ranks of a political
organization as in the files of an army. As your national chairman, I have announced
with all sincerity and without reservation that the national committee is behind every
Democratic nominee. That has to be the guiding tenet of every honest Democrat if we
are to continue in power in state and nation." Id. at 18.
In some states, e.g., Ohio, no one who has been defeated in the primary may become a
candidate in the general election. In the Solid South, party rules frequently produce the
same result. See PENNIMAN, op. cit. suPra note 1, at 410-1, 431.
Note, however, that on occasion the party organization has refused to go along with
the successful primary candidate. For example, Montana Democrats in 1920 refused to
support the successful candidate of the Non-Partisan League. PENNIMAN, op. cit. stipra
note 1, at 149.
54. The placing of candidates on primary ballots also necessitates compliance with
various legal requirements. In this respect, thd League's experience is interesting. Its
well-knit organization extending down to the individual farmer in each locality had no
difficulty in getting signatures and regularly amassed far more than the minimum required.
The League met virtually every obstacle that a protestant group seeking power might
expect to encounter. Since its tactics represented a novel use of the party primary and
its program was a modified form of socialism, every effort was made to discredit the
organization. Newspapers launched a campaign of vilification. A rival organization was
set up. Old party leaders attempted to bar League men from sitting on party committees,
Yet in the face of these pressures, the League maintained the loyalty of its members and
was able to achieve its limited aims. See GASToN, THE No N-PARTISAN LEAGUE, cC. 9, 10
(1920).
55. Senators Ladd and Frazier.
56. The League successively entered Minnesota, South Dakota, Montana, Idaho,
Washington, Colorado, Nebraska, Iowa, Oklahoma, Kansas, Texas and Wisconsin.
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party primary, did it resort to third party action. The magnitude of the
League's success in the early twenties may be measured by the fact that men
of the radical farmer delegation whom it had helped nominate and elect held
the balance of power in the Senate 7
In comparison with the difficulties confronting independent political action,
this experience of the Non-Partisan League points out an avenue of the great-
est potentiality for an independent group 8s It should be noted, however, that
the practical problem of organizing support, although simpler, is not avoided.
The primary election must still be won, entailing a struggle possibly requiring
years for eventual success. A group may thus face delay in presenting its pro-
gram to the entire voting public. But if its aim is to capture power, this im-
mediate disadvantage is offset by the possibility of working under far more
favorable conditions to reach its goal.
If, on the other -hand, a group, out to call attention to certain needed re-
forms, makes this educational function its primary aim, the tactical advantages
the primary system offers may well become secondary considerations. By the
same token, the maximal hope of third party action under these circumstances
can only be the adoption of its program by one of the major parties. This is
not to belittle the educational function third parties can play. ° Indeed, it be-
comes the only possible hope for groups, such as the Prohibition Party, which
have consistently placed candidates in the presidential elections but have failed
to compete seriously with the major parties. Again, however, the practical
problem of finding support is far from totally avoided. If the major parties
are to become interested in a given program, a third party must be able to at-
tract a considerable following. Once more the gaining of convincing support
over and beyond the requirements of ballot legislation will be the obstacle
facing third party action.*
57. Senators Ladd and Frazier of North Dakota, LaFollette of Wisconsin, Brook-
hart of Iowa, Howell of Nebraska, and Shipstead of Minnesota, the latter elected by the
successful action of the newly-formed Farmer-Labor Party. See Rowell, Why 11 Middle
West Went Radical, 46 Von's Woan 157 (1923).
58. Indeed, Robert LaFollette, despite his open opposition to many of the policies of
the Republican party, was also able to work through the Republican primary system in
order to return repeatedly to the Senate.
In one-party regions such as the South, the primary offers the only real opportunity
for a decision among conflicting groups and principles.
Today, the control of the Democratic-Farmer Labor party of Minnesota is openly
disputed by the Truman and Wallace factions. In February of this year, former Governor
Benson openly predicted Wallace would win the party's primary and would thereby force
President Truman to seek nomination via the petition procedure usually reserved for minor
party candidates. N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1948, p. 3, col. 5, June 15, 1948, p. 31, cols. 6, 7.
59. It is difficult, however, to evaluate the influence of third party movements in this
field. Perhaps, the most successful instance was provided by the Populist Party which
gained the largest third party vote prior to the 1900's. But many other claims can easily
be countered by more plausible explanations. For example, the Anti-Saloon League, not
the Prohibition Party, was seemingly most influential in arousing public support for the
18th Amendment. See PENNmrAN, op. cit. mspra note 1, at 262.
* This Comment was prepared jointly by a member of the Journal Board together
with Karl Cerny, Graduate Student, Department of Political Science, Yale University.
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